5 Ekim 2012 Cuma
How to make a profit through price obfuscation
The standard model of competition with a homogeneous good tells us that every supplier will apply the same, low price. This situation of perfect competition arises because there is no good differentiation and suppliers cannot exploit any market power, because they have none. They end up with little profit.
Suppose they can now artificially differentiate the good. Ioana Chioveanu and Jidong Zhou say this could happen in the way the price information is presented, for example by omitting taxes, or slicing the price in pieces for various components of the service, like for some flights, hotel nights or shipping fees. All this leads to price obfuscation. firms then start to compete on price and price "frame." Just look on Amazon.com how participating resellers can offer very different prices by adding wildly different shipping pricing. Or how sellers may add coupons for future purchases. And there are plenty of other examples.
Chioveanu and Zhou that within such a framework various competitive equilibria can result because consumer may get confused and fail to buy the best deal. This is equivalent to saying consumers are irrational, and of course anything can then happen. What is more interesting is that there is still competitive pressure, as suppliers may converge to more transparent pricing. Equilibria are such that firm randomize both price and price frames. If more firms enter the market (as it supports more profits), it becomes more difficult to obfuscate prices using price frames, so firms make those even more complex, resulting paradoxically in more profits.
I think it has been very welcome that in the US airline ticket prices now need to include all taxes and fees. It would not hurt if other prices could also include all taxes, but as this model shows, this needs to be initiated by the government, as the industry will not do it voluntarily. And this also shows that there is some good to say about the European Union's efforts into standardizing goods and price frames.
Suppose they can now artificially differentiate the good. Ioana Chioveanu and Jidong Zhou say this could happen in the way the price information is presented, for example by omitting taxes, or slicing the price in pieces for various components of the service, like for some flights, hotel nights or shipping fees. All this leads to price obfuscation. firms then start to compete on price and price "frame." Just look on Amazon.com how participating resellers can offer very different prices by adding wildly different shipping pricing. Or how sellers may add coupons for future purchases. And there are plenty of other examples.
Chioveanu and Zhou that within such a framework various competitive equilibria can result because consumer may get confused and fail to buy the best deal. This is equivalent to saying consumers are irrational, and of course anything can then happen. What is more interesting is that there is still competitive pressure, as suppliers may converge to more transparent pricing. Equilibria are such that firm randomize both price and price frames. If more firms enter the market (as it supports more profits), it becomes more difficult to obfuscate prices using price frames, so firms make those even more complex, resulting paradoxically in more profits.
I think it has been very welcome that in the US airline ticket prices now need to include all taxes and fees. It would not hurt if other prices could also include all taxes, but as this model shows, this needs to be initiated by the government, as the industry will not do it voluntarily. And this also shows that there is some good to say about the European Union's efforts into standardizing goods and price frames.
4 Ekim 2012 Perşembe
Why is there so little Economics in environmental policy?
A persistent frustration for economists is that policy makers do not listen to them, especially politicians. That they then accuse economists for bad outcomes is then the cherry on top. One area were has been the most evident is in dealing with the environment. Why is it that policy makers (and environmentalists) are reluctant to adopt market-based solutions to environmental issues?
Dallas Burtraw looks at the case of the United States and concludes that this all boils down to politics, and more precisely the federalist institutions. In other words, economists do not take into account the institutional framework where their policies need to fit in, a lament that has also resonated with implementers of development policies. In the case of environmental policy in the US, the issue is mostly that the states have to implement federal policy, and it is much easier to issue emissions caps, compared to coax them to manage honestly cap-and-trade market or collect carbon taxes. For example, consider electricity markets, which are heavily regulated in some states, which means the price signal has less value. Or a state may try to attract industries by circumventing the impact of environmental policies if they are price-based. All-in-all, a political economy of the environment is as much needed as environmental economics.
Dallas Burtraw looks at the case of the United States and concludes that this all boils down to politics, and more precisely the federalist institutions. In other words, economists do not take into account the institutional framework where their policies need to fit in, a lament that has also resonated with implementers of development policies. In the case of environmental policy in the US, the issue is mostly that the states have to implement federal policy, and it is much easier to issue emissions caps, compared to coax them to manage honestly cap-and-trade market or collect carbon taxes. For example, consider electricity markets, which are heavily regulated in some states, which means the price signal has less value. Or a state may try to attract industries by circumventing the impact of environmental policies if they are price-based. All-in-all, a political economy of the environment is as much needed as environmental economics.
3 Ekim 2012 Çarşamba
Why do Indian and Mexican plants not grow?
When a business is successful, it grows. Successful businesses also are more likely to survive and thus old business tend to be larger. Now define business. The business unit relevant for this is difficult to ascertain, for example because of mergers and acquisitions, or simply because the boundaries of a firm are hard to establish (are contractors part of it? Subsidiaries?). Thus the common way to measure a business is at the plant level.
Chang-Tai Hsieh and Peter Klenow show that plants in India and Mexico do not grow with age, or much less than, say, the United States. This points to a very inefficient allocation of resources, as successful plants should invest to grow: they are obviously better than the competition, thus can produce more efficiently or better goods. With a simple simulation exercise, Hsieh and Klenow show that this lack of plant growth leads to a 25% productivity loss compared to US plant growth.
The question is of course why plant growth is stifled in India and Mexico. For India, it is rather obvious, with policies that favor small businesses and actively prevent them to grow "too large." Many of these policies, which are heavily promoted by owners of incumbent plants, are being revoked and can in part be credited for the large recent growth of the Indian economy. As for Mexico, it has been suggested that when plants grow from the informal to the formal sector of the economy, they are subject to more taxes and regulations. In both cases, inappropriate institutions are to blame.
Chang-Tai Hsieh and Peter Klenow show that plants in India and Mexico do not grow with age, or much less than, say, the United States. This points to a very inefficient allocation of resources, as successful plants should invest to grow: they are obviously better than the competition, thus can produce more efficiently or better goods. With a simple simulation exercise, Hsieh and Klenow show that this lack of plant growth leads to a 25% productivity loss compared to US plant growth.
The question is of course why plant growth is stifled in India and Mexico. For India, it is rather obvious, with policies that favor small businesses and actively prevent them to grow "too large." Many of these policies, which are heavily promoted by owners of incumbent plants, are being revoked and can in part be credited for the large recent growth of the Indian economy. As for Mexico, it has been suggested that when plants grow from the informal to the formal sector of the economy, they are subject to more taxes and regulations. In both cases, inappropriate institutions are to blame.
2 Ekim 2012 Salı
Disclosing hospital quality works
Usually, better information leads to better outcomes (well except for those people who could exploit some information asymmetry). People can better evaluate their options, and they do not like uncertainty. The impact of information on behavior, however, is ambiguous. For example, I recently discussed the case of a supervision contract that needs artificial uncertainty to be constraint-efficient. Disclosing the quality of some goods provided by the state, such as schools, is contentious. In that case, it turns out to be beneficial.
The same seems to apply for hospitals. Lapo Filistrucchi and Fatih Cemil Ozbugday study data from German hospitals when mandatory quality reports were introduced. This new policy improved overall quality, and more so in hospitals that were initially graded inferior. Those that were initially better had more patients thereafter, thus the public looked at those grades. And where there was more hospital density, the authors can see more quality improvements, indicating that competition is at work in beneficial ways. An improvement in overall well-being is thus likely (we cannot be sure, as the use of resources to reach quality improvements is not measured).
The same seems to apply for hospitals. Lapo Filistrucchi and Fatih Cemil Ozbugday study data from German hospitals when mandatory quality reports were introduced. This new policy improved overall quality, and more so in hospitals that were initially graded inferior. Those that were initially better had more patients thereafter, thus the public looked at those grades. And where there was more hospital density, the authors can see more quality improvements, indicating that competition is at work in beneficial ways. An improvement in overall well-being is thus likely (we cannot be sure, as the use of resources to reach quality improvements is not measured).
1 Ekim 2012 Pazartesi
A negative discount rate for climate policy?
Ever since the Stern Review on climate change came out, the debate has raged about what the appropriate discount rate should be to evaluate future environmental outcomes. Biologists do not see the point of discounting, but they have a biased view as they advocate preservation at any cost (much like doctors advocate preserving every life at any cost). In any case, computing future benefits of something at an infinite horizon is impossible if there is no discounting and the benefits do not decrease.
Marc Fleurbaey and Stéphane Zuber actually advocate that we should use a negative discount rate. Technically, that it is only possible to calculate the net present value with a negative discount rate only if the periodic values decrease at a faster rate than the absolute value of this negative discount rate. The key here is not to think of the discount rate as a fixed number, but rather as a result from the ratio of marginal utility from successive periods (or generations). If future generations are worse off, the discount rate becomes indeed negative. Whether future generations will indeed be worse off is is difficult to ascertain, but it could happen. But this is not how we should think about this.
The proper measurement is to use the marginal utility of the person alleviating today the impact of climate change versus the marginal utility of the person in the future benefiting from this action in the future. This is a person-to-person calculation. The present one is likely rich, the future one likely poor. Thus the discount rate should results from the comparison of these marginal utilities is negative, especially because the developing economies are likely to suffer the most from climate change.
Marc Fleurbaey and Stéphane Zuber actually advocate that we should use a negative discount rate. Technically, that it is only possible to calculate the net present value with a negative discount rate only if the periodic values decrease at a faster rate than the absolute value of this negative discount rate. The key here is not to think of the discount rate as a fixed number, but rather as a result from the ratio of marginal utility from successive periods (or generations). If future generations are worse off, the discount rate becomes indeed negative. Whether future generations will indeed be worse off is is difficult to ascertain, but it could happen. But this is not how we should think about this.
The proper measurement is to use the marginal utility of the person alleviating today the impact of climate change versus the marginal utility of the person in the future benefiting from this action in the future. This is a person-to-person calculation. The present one is likely rich, the future one likely poor. Thus the discount rate should results from the comparison of these marginal utilities is negative, especially because the developing economies are likely to suffer the most from climate change.
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5 Ekim 2012 Cuma
How to make a profit through price obfuscation
The standard model of competition with a homogeneous good tells us that every supplier will apply the same, low price. This situation of perfect competition arises because there is no good differentiation and suppliers cannot exploit any market power, because they have none. They end up with little profit.
Suppose they can now artificially differentiate the good. Ioana Chioveanu and Jidong Zhou say this could happen in the way the price information is presented, for example by omitting taxes, or slicing the price in pieces for various components of the service, like for some flights, hotel nights or shipping fees. All this leads to price obfuscation. firms then start to compete on price and price "frame." Just look on Amazon.com how participating resellers can offer very different prices by adding wildly different shipping pricing. Or how sellers may add coupons for future purchases. And there are plenty of other examples.
Chioveanu and Zhou that within such a framework various competitive equilibria can result because consumer may get confused and fail to buy the best deal. This is equivalent to saying consumers are irrational, and of course anything can then happen. What is more interesting is that there is still competitive pressure, as suppliers may converge to more transparent pricing. Equilibria are such that firm randomize both price and price frames. If more firms enter the market (as it supports more profits), it becomes more difficult to obfuscate prices using price frames, so firms make those even more complex, resulting paradoxically in more profits.
I think it has been very welcome that in the US airline ticket prices now need to include all taxes and fees. It would not hurt if other prices could also include all taxes, but as this model shows, this needs to be initiated by the government, as the industry will not do it voluntarily. And this also shows that there is some good to say about the European Union's efforts into standardizing goods and price frames.
Suppose they can now artificially differentiate the good. Ioana Chioveanu and Jidong Zhou say this could happen in the way the price information is presented, for example by omitting taxes, or slicing the price in pieces for various components of the service, like for some flights, hotel nights or shipping fees. All this leads to price obfuscation. firms then start to compete on price and price "frame." Just look on Amazon.com how participating resellers can offer very different prices by adding wildly different shipping pricing. Or how sellers may add coupons for future purchases. And there are plenty of other examples.
Chioveanu and Zhou that within such a framework various competitive equilibria can result because consumer may get confused and fail to buy the best deal. This is equivalent to saying consumers are irrational, and of course anything can then happen. What is more interesting is that there is still competitive pressure, as suppliers may converge to more transparent pricing. Equilibria are such that firm randomize both price and price frames. If more firms enter the market (as it supports more profits), it becomes more difficult to obfuscate prices using price frames, so firms make those even more complex, resulting paradoxically in more profits.
I think it has been very welcome that in the US airline ticket prices now need to include all taxes and fees. It would not hurt if other prices could also include all taxes, but as this model shows, this needs to be initiated by the government, as the industry will not do it voluntarily. And this also shows that there is some good to say about the European Union's efforts into standardizing goods and price frames.
4 Ekim 2012 Perşembe
Why is there so little Economics in environmental policy?
A persistent frustration for economists is that policy makers do not listen to them, especially politicians. That they then accuse economists for bad outcomes is then the cherry on top. One area were has been the most evident is in dealing with the environment. Why is it that policy makers (and environmentalists) are reluctant to adopt market-based solutions to environmental issues?
Dallas Burtraw looks at the case of the United States and concludes that this all boils down to politics, and more precisely the federalist institutions. In other words, economists do not take into account the institutional framework where their policies need to fit in, a lament that has also resonated with implementers of development policies. In the case of environmental policy in the US, the issue is mostly that the states have to implement federal policy, and it is much easier to issue emissions caps, compared to coax them to manage honestly cap-and-trade market or collect carbon taxes. For example, consider electricity markets, which are heavily regulated in some states, which means the price signal has less value. Or a state may try to attract industries by circumventing the impact of environmental policies if they are price-based. All-in-all, a political economy of the environment is as much needed as environmental economics.
Dallas Burtraw looks at the case of the United States and concludes that this all boils down to politics, and more precisely the federalist institutions. In other words, economists do not take into account the institutional framework where their policies need to fit in, a lament that has also resonated with implementers of development policies. In the case of environmental policy in the US, the issue is mostly that the states have to implement federal policy, and it is much easier to issue emissions caps, compared to coax them to manage honestly cap-and-trade market or collect carbon taxes. For example, consider electricity markets, which are heavily regulated in some states, which means the price signal has less value. Or a state may try to attract industries by circumventing the impact of environmental policies if they are price-based. All-in-all, a political economy of the environment is as much needed as environmental economics.
3 Ekim 2012 Çarşamba
Why do Indian and Mexican plants not grow?
When a business is successful, it grows. Successful businesses also are more likely to survive and thus old business tend to be larger. Now define business. The business unit relevant for this is difficult to ascertain, for example because of mergers and acquisitions, or simply because the boundaries of a firm are hard to establish (are contractors part of it? Subsidiaries?). Thus the common way to measure a business is at the plant level.
Chang-Tai Hsieh and Peter Klenow show that plants in India and Mexico do not grow with age, or much less than, say, the United States. This points to a very inefficient allocation of resources, as successful plants should invest to grow: they are obviously better than the competition, thus can produce more efficiently or better goods. With a simple simulation exercise, Hsieh and Klenow show that this lack of plant growth leads to a 25% productivity loss compared to US plant growth.
The question is of course why plant growth is stifled in India and Mexico. For India, it is rather obvious, with policies that favor small businesses and actively prevent them to grow "too large." Many of these policies, which are heavily promoted by owners of incumbent plants, are being revoked and can in part be credited for the large recent growth of the Indian economy. As for Mexico, it has been suggested that when plants grow from the informal to the formal sector of the economy, they are subject to more taxes and regulations. In both cases, inappropriate institutions are to blame.
Chang-Tai Hsieh and Peter Klenow show that plants in India and Mexico do not grow with age, or much less than, say, the United States. This points to a very inefficient allocation of resources, as successful plants should invest to grow: they are obviously better than the competition, thus can produce more efficiently or better goods. With a simple simulation exercise, Hsieh and Klenow show that this lack of plant growth leads to a 25% productivity loss compared to US plant growth.
The question is of course why plant growth is stifled in India and Mexico. For India, it is rather obvious, with policies that favor small businesses and actively prevent them to grow "too large." Many of these policies, which are heavily promoted by owners of incumbent plants, are being revoked and can in part be credited for the large recent growth of the Indian economy. As for Mexico, it has been suggested that when plants grow from the informal to the formal sector of the economy, they are subject to more taxes and regulations. In both cases, inappropriate institutions are to blame.
2 Ekim 2012 Salı
Disclosing hospital quality works
Usually, better information leads to better outcomes (well except for those people who could exploit some information asymmetry). People can better evaluate their options, and they do not like uncertainty. The impact of information on behavior, however, is ambiguous. For example, I recently discussed the case of a supervision contract that needs artificial uncertainty to be constraint-efficient. Disclosing the quality of some goods provided by the state, such as schools, is contentious. In that case, it turns out to be beneficial.
The same seems to apply for hospitals. Lapo Filistrucchi and Fatih Cemil Ozbugday study data from German hospitals when mandatory quality reports were introduced. This new policy improved overall quality, and more so in hospitals that were initially graded inferior. Those that were initially better had more patients thereafter, thus the public looked at those grades. And where there was more hospital density, the authors can see more quality improvements, indicating that competition is at work in beneficial ways. An improvement in overall well-being is thus likely (we cannot be sure, as the use of resources to reach quality improvements is not measured).
The same seems to apply for hospitals. Lapo Filistrucchi and Fatih Cemil Ozbugday study data from German hospitals when mandatory quality reports were introduced. This new policy improved overall quality, and more so in hospitals that were initially graded inferior. Those that were initially better had more patients thereafter, thus the public looked at those grades. And where there was more hospital density, the authors can see more quality improvements, indicating that competition is at work in beneficial ways. An improvement in overall well-being is thus likely (we cannot be sure, as the use of resources to reach quality improvements is not measured).
1 Ekim 2012 Pazartesi
A negative discount rate for climate policy?
Ever since the Stern Review on climate change came out, the debate has raged about what the appropriate discount rate should be to evaluate future environmental outcomes. Biologists do not see the point of discounting, but they have a biased view as they advocate preservation at any cost (much like doctors advocate preserving every life at any cost). In any case, computing future benefits of something at an infinite horizon is impossible if there is no discounting and the benefits do not decrease.
Marc Fleurbaey and Stéphane Zuber actually advocate that we should use a negative discount rate. Technically, that it is only possible to calculate the net present value with a negative discount rate only if the periodic values decrease at a faster rate than the absolute value of this negative discount rate. The key here is not to think of the discount rate as a fixed number, but rather as a result from the ratio of marginal utility from successive periods (or generations). If future generations are worse off, the discount rate becomes indeed negative. Whether future generations will indeed be worse off is is difficult to ascertain, but it could happen. But this is not how we should think about this.
The proper measurement is to use the marginal utility of the person alleviating today the impact of climate change versus the marginal utility of the person in the future benefiting from this action in the future. This is a person-to-person calculation. The present one is likely rich, the future one likely poor. Thus the discount rate should results from the comparison of these marginal utilities is negative, especially because the developing economies are likely to suffer the most from climate change.
Marc Fleurbaey and Stéphane Zuber actually advocate that we should use a negative discount rate. Technically, that it is only possible to calculate the net present value with a negative discount rate only if the periodic values decrease at a faster rate than the absolute value of this negative discount rate. The key here is not to think of the discount rate as a fixed number, but rather as a result from the ratio of marginal utility from successive periods (or generations). If future generations are worse off, the discount rate becomes indeed negative. Whether future generations will indeed be worse off is is difficult to ascertain, but it could happen. But this is not how we should think about this.
The proper measurement is to use the marginal utility of the person alleviating today the impact of climate change versus the marginal utility of the person in the future benefiting from this action in the future. This is a person-to-person calculation. The present one is likely rich, the future one likely poor. Thus the discount rate should results from the comparison of these marginal utilities is negative, especially because the developing economies are likely to suffer the most from climate change.
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